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The securities antifraud provision is a bastard. It has no 
indisputable parentage; its existence is attributed to a federal statute, 
but its features are borrowed from state law, a body of law that the 
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enacting Congress presumably believed was inadequate.1 Why would 
Congress borrow from state law that it considered deficient? Even 
though the antifraud provision has come of age largely through judicial 
construction similar to the laudatory process that underlies our 
common law, critics attack the antifraud provision like no comparable 
common-law development. To many scholars, private antifraud suits 
are not viewed as a net benefit, but as a menace.2 As a consequence, the 
fate of future suits under the antifraud provision always appears to 
hang in the balance of the next Supreme Court decision. The 
uncertainty is because most Supreme Court decisions construing the 
statute have largely restricted the scope of the antifraud provision; over 
the years, the Supreme Court has limited the antifraud private cause 
of action through decisions regarding who has standing to sue,3 what 
constitutes culpable conduct,4 and who is responsible for fraudulent 
conduct.5 On each of these issues, the Supreme Court has restrained 
the scope of the private action. Following Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,6 the vultures once again circle the 
antifraud provision. 
Lurking in the shadows is a potentially mortal blow to the 
securities class action because it appears the Supreme Court is poised 
 
 1. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1987) (observing that actions 
under Rule 10b-5 are “designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law”). 
 2. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on 
the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 161–63 (2011) (arguing that SEC enforcement is less costly and 
more productive than private enforcement); Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 727, 746–48 (1995) (arguing that the SEC should exercise its rulemaking authority to address 
features of Rule 10b-5 that lead to abusive litigation practices); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming 
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private 
Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354–58 (2008) (proposing that the SEC 
serve a clearing function for the conduct of private securities class actions). 
 3. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, 739–41 (1975) (imposing 
a rigid requirement that a private litigant must be an actual purchaser or seller in connection with 
the fraud, reasoning that otherwise, the cause of action would invite costly and “vexatious” 
litigation). 
 4. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–80 (1977) (holding that antifraud 
provision proscribes material misrepresentation or manipulation, not breaches of fiduciary duty 
or unfair conduct); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201–05 (1976) (holding that 
provision only reaches misrepresentations committed with scienter); see also Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (holding that antifraud provision does not apply 
extraterritorially). 
 5. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) 
(holding that responsibility for material misrepresentation extends only to those who had ultimate 
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how the statement would be 
released); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 175–77 (1994) 
(holding that those who merely aid and abet another’s violation are not liable under the antifraud 
provision). 
 6. 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1184 (2013). 
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to address an aspect of causation that strikes at the heart of such 
suits—the ability of injured investors to aggregate their claims on the 
theory that the defendant’s misrepresentation constituted fraud on the 
market. Unlike the other significant elements of the antifraud private 
cause of action, Supreme Court precedent on causation is something of 
a mixed bag. While there are Supreme Court precedents addressing 
causation that favor plaintiffs,7 the more recent forays into this subject 
suggest a more conservative tilt.8 That trend, and the overall 
unwelcome reception the antifraud provision has received on other 
issues, may just document the belief that with respect to the antifraud 
provision, once a bastard always a bastard. This denouncement need 
hardly be the case. This Article takes a more hopeful course by 
clarifying the role that causation should play in private securities 
litigation and showing how that objective can be achieved within 
current Supreme Court formulations of causation. 
Most investors who believe they have been defrauded in 
connection with trades on a market, like those in Amgen, cannot 
practically pursue their claims other than through a class action. 
Within this context, a court’s decisions both to certify the class and to 
deny a motion to dismiss define the ultimate fate of the suit. For the 
risk-averse defendant who loses each of these skirmishes, the optimal 
strategy is to settle the suit. In contrast, for investors in such suits, class 
certification is not just one of the hurdles that must be successfully 
vaulted to obtain compensation for damages caused by the 
misrepresentation; it frequently is the highest of the hurdles. Failing 
certification, there is no effective means for investors to assert their 
claims; it is only through aggregation of claims that a suit is practicable 
since most claimants’ losses are not large enough to justify the expense 
of their individual prosecution. Requiring that investors establish the 
misrepresentation’s materiality as a precondition to class certification 
 
 7. Plaintiffs have enjoyed some success on the scope of materiality. See, e.g., Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011) (holding materiality of possible side 
effects of a pharmaceutical company’s major product can exist even without statistically significant 
evidence of a causal link); Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095–96 (1991) 
(holding opinion statements that are inconsistent with objective evidence between the defendant 
are facts); see also Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 652 (2010) (holding statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until a plaintiff does discover, or a reasonably diligent plaintiff could have 
discovered, facts constituting a violation). 
 8. See, e.g., Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2302–03 (interpreting scope of primary participant 
narrowly so it reaches only one with ultimate control of a false statement’s dissemination); 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008) (rejecting 
scheme liability with the result that those who actively conspire to assist another in issuing false 
financial statements are not primary participants); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
345–46 (2005) (imposing a requirement that complaint must allege facts supporting the claim that 
misrepresentation caused the investor to suffer an economic loss). 
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inserts another point of friction into the investor’s access to the 
settlement arena. For defendants, this requirement is one more means 
to avoid settling a suit. 
Therefore, the sine qua non for any securities class action is 
successfully invoking the fraud-on-the-market approach to establishing 
causation. Fraud on the market was embraced by the Supreme Court 
in a 4 to 2 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,9 a case that appears 
destined to be revisited, likely soon.10 This Article argues that lower 
courts have misunderstood Basic. The prevailing misunderstanding is 
attributable to the Basic court’s failure to comprehend the foundations 
of its own reasoning: the meaning and implications of the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
Because Supreme Court precedent is difficult to reverse, this 
Article does not seek to correct Basic. Instead, this Article counsels 
reorientation, not correction. More specifically, the Author argues that 
the future course should be set by the majority opinion and Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in Amgen, as they more clearly illuminate the best 
path for future securities class actions. When fraud on the market, or 
any other dimension of causation in private securities law claims, comes 
before the Court, Amgen should provide the resolving foundation and 
framework, not Basic. 
II. BASIC UNVARNISHED 
The Court first recognized fraud on the market in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, where on three occasions over a thirteen-month period Basic 
publicly disclaimed any knowledge of a company development that 
would explain the increased trading in its stock. In fact, Basic was 
engaged in negotiations for its own acquisition.11 When Basic 
announced it would merge with Combustion Engineering, its stock 
soared. Disappointed investors who sold Basic’s shares in the interval 
between the company’s first denial and the merger announcement 
brought a class action alleging the misstatements were materially 
misleading because Basic had been locked in discussions and 
negotiations with Combustion during the thirteen-month period. Their 
suit would ultimately establish the parameters within which the 
securities class action suit survives, if only barely at times. 
 
 9. 485 U.S. 224, 249–50 (1988). 
 10. In Amgen, Justice Alito openly invited reconsideration of fraud on the market. 133 S. Ct. 
at 1204 (Alito J., concurring). In a portion of Justice Thomas’s dissent joined by Justices Kennedy 
and Scalia, Justice Thomas labels Basic itself as “questionable.” Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas J., 
dissenting). 
 11. Basic, 485 U.S. at 227. 
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In addition to holding that the materiality of speculative 
information should be the product of the event’s magnitude and the 
probability of its occurrence,12 the Court upheld fraud on the market. 
The Court held reliance was required for private suits under the 
antifraud provision. However, the slight majority of four of the 
participating Justices held that investors are presumed to rely on the 
security’s price reflected in all publicly available information in well-
developed markets.13 
While clearly holding “that reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-
5 cause of action”14 and explaining that “[r]eliance provides the 
requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation 
and a plaintiff’s injury,”15 Basic provides an important qualification to 
these conclusions by observing that “[t]here is . . . more than one way to 
demonstrate the causal connection.”16 Basic references the Court’s 
earlier decisions in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, viewing it 
as a decision in which reliance was dispensed with (rather than, as 
argued below, being based on an array of facts from which reliance was 
easily deduced), as well as Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. (where the 
requisite causation was met by the necessity of the proxy solicitation, 
not the particular defect in the proxy materials, being essential to 
consummating the alleged harmful transaction).17 Blackmun’s majority 
opinion in Basic holds that reliance was satisfied by allegations that the 
investors relied on the integrity of the price reflected in the market. 
Notably, only once did the Court in Basic expressly reference the 
concept of an “efficient market,” and then only when quoting the 
approach taken by the court of appeals below.18 More frequently, the 
Court used the less technical adjectives “developed,”19 “well-
developed,”20 or “modern”21 when referring to securities markets on 
which investors presumably rely for securities’ prices that reflect 
publicly available information: 
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed 
securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material 
information regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will 
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
 
 12. Id. at 238–39 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 13. Id. at 246–47. 
 14. Id. at 243. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 243 (citing Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1970)). 
 18. Id. at 248 & n.27. 
 19. Id. at 241, 244 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 20. Id. at 246. 
 21. Id. at 243. 
3 - Cox PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/22/2013 3:51 PM 
1724 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:6:1719 
misstatements. . . . The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the 
plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct 
reliance on misrepresentations.22 
Justice Blackmun further supported the plurality opinion by 
contrasting personal, face-to-face decisionmaking with impersonal 
market transactions: 
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor’s reliance upon information is 
into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor. With the presence of a 
market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits 
information to the investor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is 
performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by the investor in a face-
to-face transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing 
him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the 
market price.23 
The Court approved the presumption used by the lower courts, 
which stated that “persons who had traded Basic shares had done so in 
reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market.”24 Note that the 
presumed reliance is not on any particular information that may have 
impacted a security’s price but on the general belief that financially 
significant information may impact the security’s price. Importantly, 
the Court reached this conclusion because it found a strong 
congressional objective to facilitate investor reliance on the “integrity” 
of securities markets. It further supported its conclusion regarding how 
stock prices are formed in well-developed markets.25 While lower court 
decisions subsequent to Basic consistently condition its application on 
a finding that the market in question is an “efficient” one, Basic referred 
more generally to “developed,” “well-developed,” or “modern” markets. 
It did not invoke the “efficient market” moniker used by economists to 
describe the hypothesized performance of capital markets. Importantly, 
 
 22. Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61). The reasoning adopted in Basic was 
more fully developed earlier in a leading fraud-on-the-market case, Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 
891 (9th Cir. 1975). Blackie concluded that:  
[The investor] relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set 
and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus 
indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price whether he is 
aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations.  
Id. at 907. The court further supported its position by concluding the approach was consistent with 
the antifraud statute to “foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud an 
expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely.” Id.; see also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161 (“In an 
open and developed market, the dissemination of material misrepresentations or withholding of 
material information typically affects the price of the stock, and purchasers generally rely on the 
price of the stock as a reflection of its value.”). Basic also held that fraud on the market was 
consistent with Congress’s intent. See 485 U.S. at 245–46. 
 23. 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)). 
 24. Id. at 245. 
 25. Id. at 246. 
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Basic anchors its approach on the grounds that historically justify 
courts’ reliance on presumptions, namely “fairness, public policy, and 
probability, as well as judicial economy.”26 To further support 
presuming investor reliance, Basic invoked the contemporary empirical 
evidence of stock-price formation and related commentary on the 
implications of that literature for the conduct of securities class actions 
as support with respect to the probability component of the factors 
considered to invoke resort to a presumption of reliance.27 
III. THE POST-BASIC MUDDLE 
Post-Basic lower court decisions have considerably narrowed its 
holding regarding fraud on the market by seeking evidence of speed or 
accuracy of price formation as a predicate for certifying class actions on 
the basis of fraud on the market. 28 With some consistency, for example, 
lower courts have withheld class certification on the basis of fraud on 
the market where there is evidence that a security does not reflect all 
public information. In In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation, the 
First Circuit reversed the district court’s certification of the class when 
it found that the defendant shares were traded in a market where the 
security’s price rapidly reflects only most material information.29 The 
First Circuit vacated the certification and remanded the case so that 
the district court could consider certification pursuant to the First 
Circuit’s standard.30 The panel reasoned that the presumption of 
investor reliance is valid only when the market is efficient. The panel 
defined market efficiency as when the market rapidly reflects all 
information relevant to the company’s value.31 
PolyMedica also concluded that efficiency does not require proof 
that the particular security’s price, after reflecting “all” public 
 
 26. Id. at 245. 
 27. Id. at 246 n.24 (citing to authorities reviewing studies bearing on the efficient market 
hypothesis). 
 28. See, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2005). Unger denied class 
certification for a suit involving securities traded in the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board because 
small-capitalization issuer traded in a less-organized market was not considered efficient. Id. 
(“[T]he available material information concerning the stock translates into an effect on the market 
price and supports a class-wide presumption of reliance.”). Suits have fared no better for shares 
traded on the NASDAQ National Market. See Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 315 
(5th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing turnover as a percentage of outstanding shares, not the particular 
exchange, when assessing whether shares were efficiently traded). 
 29. 432 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 30. Id. at 19. 
 31. Id. at 14. 
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information, is accurate.32 It is sufficient that the price responds rapidly 
to financially significant information. This is commonly referred to as 
the market being “informationally efficient.” Because prices can vary 
from the securities’ intrinsic value—a matter on which investors likely 
hold different beliefs—investors in such a market can reasonably 
believe a security is still worthy of being purchased or sold. Investors 
can reasonably believe the market has not correctly valued the security 
notwithstanding the richness of public information about the company’s 
future. That is, PolyMedica envisions that even in an efficient market, 
investors can garner positive returns on the basis of publicly available 
information. 
PolyMedica and the numerous other decisions that share its 
holding are paradoxical.33 Pursuant to this approach, investor reliance 
is reasonable and hence presumed for securities whose prices quickly 
respond to financially significant information. At the same time, these 
courts do not require so-called fundamental efficiency (i.e., that the 
resulting price reflects the security’s intrinsic value). Essentially, these 
courts recognize that all investors do not assume the current 
trustworthiness of the price vis-à-vis the shares’ probable intrinsic 
value. Thus, notwithstanding the public availability of information, 
reasonable investors in such a market can believe that the price may 
not reflect the security’s intrinsic value, which leads to opportunities 
for returns.34 On the one hand, this position seems entirely correct since 
 
 32. The opinion takes great care to distinguish informational efficiency from fundamental 
efficiency where the former refers to the market’s response to financially significant information, 
and the latter refers to a market where the ultimate response is an accurate pricing of the security. 
Id. at 14–17. 
 33. See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n efficient 
market . . . adjusts rapidly to reflect all new information.”); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 
F.3d 657, 661 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n an efficient market, it is assumed that all public information 
concerning a company is known to the market and reflected in the market price of the company’s 
stock.”); No. 84 Emp’r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 
F.3d 920, 947 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n a modern and efficient securities market, the market price of a 
stock incorporates all available public information.”); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 
F.3d 189, 208 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that in an efficient marketplace, “stock prices reflect all 
available relevant information about the stock’s economic value”); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 
1163 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n an open, efficient, and developed market, where millions of shares 
are traded daily, the investor must rely on the market to perform a valuation process which 
incorporates all publicly available information, including misinformation.”); Kowal v. MCI 
Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[I]n an efficient securities market all 
publicly available information regarding a company’s prospects has been reflected in its shares’ 
prices.”); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he price of an 
actively traded security in an open, well-developed, and efficient market reflects all the available 
information about the value of a company.”). 
 34. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive 
Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246 (1976) (arguing that because investors have quite different 
levels of information, it is not reasonable to assume that at any point in time the security’s price 
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financial theorists all concur that investors have heterogeneous 
expectations. Moreover, arbitrage is unlikely to eliminate material 
price differences that exist in light of such investor heterogeneity. On 
the other hand, if fraud on the market is only applied where investors 
are assumed to be unable to earn an above-average return based on 
public information, the courts appear to be invoking a different notion 
of market efficiency than is defensible under contemporary views of the 
hypothesis. 
Courts should step back from the rhetoric of market efficiency 
and instead observe what appears to be implicit in the holdings of cases 
like PolyMedica: investors believe that market-determined prices are 
noisy and inaccurate rather than a perfect reflection of all information. 
Therefore, market pricing is not perfect vis-à-vis the investor’s 
assessment of the security’s return possibilities. If these are indeed the 
features of an efficient market, then why should courts limit fraud on 
the market to such an elite subset of publicly traded securities? That is, 
if evidence of accuracy in pricing is not a condition for fraud on the 
market—so that fraud on the market is applicable where prices are 
noisy—there can be little justification for the courts to limit fraud on 
the market to large-capitalization, publicly traded firms. 
A. Inability to Test the Thesis 
To untangle the post-Basic morass, one must begin with the 
courts’ understanding of market efficiency. At the core of the lower 
courts’ interpretation of Basic is the belief that markets can be 
separated by the court’s notion of efficiency. First, the lower courts 
assume that, investors in markets believed to be efficient rely on the 
security’s price to accurately reflect truthful information, whereas 
courts believe that investors in inefficient markets cannot be assumed 
to so rely. Second, and implicit in the prior statement, courts assume 
that the security’s price of any security that does not generally trade 
efficiently will not be affected by any release of information. Courts 
therefore conclude that investors cannot be presumed to rely on 
information of any type ever being reflected in the security’s price. 
These are important assumptions; they not only artificially and 
unreasonably divide markets but also prevent any discrimination in 
assumptions regarding just how information impacts an individual 
security if that security is traded on a market that falls in the broadly 
 
will perfectly reflect the information investors have; consequently, prices are not likely to transfer 
information from the informed to the less informed investors). 
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defined inefficient category. Neither assumption is intuitively obvious, 
and both likely lack empirical support. 
Because there are no reliable models for determining the 
“correct” price of a security, it is not possible to determine whether all 
information, or even some information, is fully and rapidly impounded 
into a security’s price, such that an abnormal return would not be 
possible by investors based on such information.35 That is, the 
supposition underlying contemporary applications of fraud on the 
market is that investors in efficient markets believe that a security’s 
price reflects publicly available information regardless of whether that 
information is accurate or misleading. Pursuant to this supposition, 
investors cannot earn an above-average return by trading purely on 
public information. Correlatively, according to contemporary 
interpretations of Basic, since securities traded in inefficient markets 
do not reflect all public information, investors do not rely on the market-
pricing process as they would in an efficient market. 
Determining whether markets reflect information so robustly 
requires knowing what the “correct” price should be in light of the 
information. On this point, models fail us. Moreover, investors harbor 
heterogeneous views on the appropriate price of a security in light of 
their common knowledge of the information about the security. With no 
reliable model identifying the “correct” price, how can we conclude that 
a particular security not only moved to that price upon release of the 
information, but did so rapidly? And, if investors disagree about what 
the “correct” price should be, which one of their multiple viewpoints is 
the correct “correct” price? Leading economists have long pointed out 
that the dichotomy between efficient and inefficient markets is neither 
workable nor justified.36 None of these points appear to support the 
 
 35. Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 521 (2003): 
Market efficiency requires that an asset price fully and immediately reflect available 
information, such that no investor can earn abnormal expected returns by trading on 
the available information at the current price. In order to determine whether prices are 
efficient or not, we must be able to determine whether the current price reflects all 
available information and is “correct” such that no investor can invest at that price and 
expect to earn abnormal returns. That is, we need a model of “fundamental value” into 
which we put the “available information” and out of which we receive a price at which 
no abnormal expected returns are possible. If the current price is lower than the 
calculated price, then positive expected abnormal returns probably exist. If the current 
price is higher than the calculated price, then negative expected abnormal returns 
probably exist. In either case, we must be able to compare the current price to a 
predicted “correct” price to determine if the current price is efficient or not. 
(footnote omitted). 
 36. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market 
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986). Joining the academics is one who 
has toiled long and well in markets, George Soros. George Soros, My Market Theory: Forget 
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conclusion that investors do in fact rely on the market-pricing process 
to establish a price that represents the shares’ intrinsic value. On the 
other hand, they likely do assume that security prices are not rigged or 
otherwise impacted by false information (i.e., they rely on the overall 
honesty of securities markets). But, do investors rely on some markets 
more than others, as the courts’ binary view of markets—either efficient 
or inefficient—appears to assume?  
There are multiple mechanisms that cause some security prices, 
on average, to be less volatile and to respond more rapidly than others.37 
This does not suggest, however, that such a response means that the 
security is efficiently priced for the reasons examined above. It is not, 
therefore, possible to extrapolate from generalized findings of the 
security’s responsiveness to information either that the particular 
security has been priced efficiently or that investors in that security 
placed their reliance on the security being so priced. Any such 
conclusion would be specious.38 If the reliance element is understood as 
an element of causation, then the view of Professors Macey, Miller, 
Mitchell, and Netter advanced three decades ago remains wise 
guidance today: the efficient-versus-inefficient distinction must give 
way to objective evidence. This evidence would most likely take the form 
of a well-designed event study measuring whether the alleged fraud 
produces a statistically significant effect on the security’s price. By 
focusing on what can be empirically observed, judicial resources could 
be more appropriately directed to a finite inquiry rather than an 
amorphous, unsound, and irrelevant inquiry about whether a 
particular security was efficiently priced.39 Thus, reliance should be 
 
Theories, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at A33 (arguing that the theory regarding market efficiency 
distorts reality). 
 37. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of 
Common Stocks Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285 (1994) (stating that volume and number of analysts 
enhance speed of price change); Victor L. Bernard, Christine Botosan & Gregory D. Phillips, 
Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis: Limits to the Applicability of Fraud-on-the-Market 
Theory, 73 NEB. L. REV. 781 (1994) (examining factors likely to support efficient pricing of 
securities); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (reasoning that relative burdens to access and to interpret information 
impacts both the likelihood of and speed at which stock prices respond to information; thus, 
whatever information is implicit in past stock prices can easily be accessed and therefore reflected 
in stock prices whereas private information by insiders is not easily accessed; thus, insiders enjoy 
an unerodible advantage, which is why there is no evidence of the so-called strong form of market 
efficiency). 
 38. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and 
Extending the Reach of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991). 
 39. See id. at 1021. 
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presumed where there is reliable evidence of such a statistically 
significant effect.40 
If there is a good deal of noise surrounding the pricing of large-
capitalization firms’ securities, which are closely followed by numerous 
analysts because the markets are heavily populated by institutional 
traders, why should fraud on the market not apply to other noisy 
markets? If investors rely on the integrity of the market-pricing 
mechanism for large-capitalization firms, what persuasive evidence 
suggests that they do not similarly rely for small firms, especially if the 
pricing process of both markets is guided by heterogeneous expectations 
regarding an individual security’s value?  
No doubt Basic and the fraud-on-the-market theory’s greatest 
failing is due to their timing in the history of economics. Each occurred 
before economists fully developed important refinements and 
qualifications to the efficient market hypothesis.41 The hypothesis’s 
prescriptions were likely biased because the nature of the 
announcements studied were of the type that tended to elicit a strong 
response (e.g., unexpected earnings, merger, or significant change in 
dividends). Moreover, the early studies examined the market response 
to financially significant announcements only within a brief window.42 
Those studies did not examine whether, over some longer period, price 
formation is an ongoing, rather than rapid, process. Fraud-on-the-
market courts, after accepting an early understanding of the 
 
 40. Macey et al. support focusing on the fraud’s impact on the stock price by applying the 
same reasoning advanced in Basic: 
An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on 
the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in 
market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, 
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action. 
Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988)) (footnote omitted). There is a strong 
caveat to requiring observed stock price before finding that a material misrepresentation impacted 
investors. The approach works well for the material misstatement of unexpected news but, as 
developed later, is poorly suited to the pure omission case or a misstatement case that confirms 
investor expectations. In these two instances, the observation should shift from the moment of the 
false utterance to when the corrective disclosure is made. At that time, a noticeable price correction 
corroborates an otherwise bald assertion of material omission or misstatement. These points are 
developed later. 
 41. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to 
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 667–69 (2003) (reviewing qualifications linked to 
heterogeneous investor expectations, limits on arbitrage, and social-psychological biases that 
impact securities pricing). 
 42. See William H. Beaver, The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements, 6 
J. ACCT. RES. 67, 70 (1968); Peter Lloyd Davies, Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand 
Information, 51 J. BUS. 43, 46 (1978); Eugene F. Fama, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New 
Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 4 (1969); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market 
Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 45 (1965); Michael Firth, The Information Content of Large Investment 
Holdings, 30 J. FIN. 1265, 1269 (1975). 
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hypothesis, have not refined that understanding with contemporary 
insights regarding how markets price securities. Today, there is less 
clarity regarding the prescriptive qualities of the efficient market 
hypothesis. It remains a hypothesis, but one that is greatly qualified. 
B. Misapplied Theory and Data 
Post-Basic decisions have developed an array of criteria to 
determine if the security that is the subject of the suit was traded in an 
efficient market and, hence, if fraud on the market is an available cause 
of action. The criteria focus on daily trading volume, the number of 
analysts following the security, the presence of institutional ownership, 
and even whether the issuer is eligible for certain regulatory 
dispensations the SEC makes available to larger capitalization 
issuers.43 The courts believe that when each criterion is present, a 
security is more likely to be priced efficiently. 
In a classic article on understanding market efficiency, 
Professors Gilson and Kraakman insightfully make the point that 
whether information is impounded quickly in a security’s price depends 
a good deal on a range of externalities related to the particular bit of 
information.44 In part they reason that it is the message and the 
medium, not the market itself, that explain efficient pricing.45 Thus, we 
might find that stock prices themselves convey very little new 
information about prospective price movements because the prices are 
easily and widely observed and, hence, their information content can be 
easily extrapolated. At the other extreme, a person in possession of 
 
 43. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying five factors to 
determine an efficient market: high weekly volume, number of security analysts that follow and 
report on stock, presence of marketmakers and arbitrageurs, eligibility to use SEC Form S-3, and 
cause-and-effect relationship between news events and immediate price response); Cammer v. 
Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) (using same factors). As developed later in this Article, 
the nature of the announcement can be expected to affect the relationship between the 
announcement and a stock-price reaction to that announcement. Thus, generalized observations 
of the efficiency of a security’s normal pricing may be substantially qualified by the nature of the 
announcement itself. One study of efficiency, focused on quarterly report announcements, found 
that only two of the preceding factors appear relevant to relative efficiency in pricing securities—
volume of trading and number of analysts for the security. See Barber et al., supra note 37, at 290 
(finding that only volume of trade and number of analysts reporting on a stock accurately 
differentiated between efficient and inefficient stocks). For an early critique arguing that there is 
no reliable litmus test for determining ex ante whether a security trades in an efficient market, 
see Jonathan R. Macey, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL 
L. REV. 923, 925 (1989) (discussing difficulties of determining whether securities trade in an 
efficient market). 
 44. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 597–98 (noting externalities such as 
information costs have a significant impact on market efficiency). 
 45. See id. 
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nonpublic information derives a significant advantage over others 
because the acquisition costs to noninsiders are so formidable. It is just 
too costly and time consuming for outsiders to acquire such nonpublic 
information. Occupying a large space between these two extremes is 
public information; not only is there some friction in accessing public 
information but the processing costs in many instances likely slow the 
reflection of that information in the security’s price. We can expect that 
not all public information will be impounded in a security’s price with 
the same alacrity, or perhaps with any quickness at all. That is, 
message as well as medium likely impacts the quickness with which a 
security’s price reflects particular information. Therefore, a continuum 
likely exists regarding whether and how rapidly a security’s price will 
reflect public information in which the nature of the information is as 
significant as other variables, such as the relative size of the security’s 
issuer, number of analysts that follow it, and presence of arbitrageurs. 
Hence, even for a security traded in an efficient market, as in Amgen, 
we should expect some types of newly released information to impact 
the security’s price more quickly than other types of information, 
notwithstanding the fact that each announcement is material. 
Thus, even though a company’s shares are traded on the Over-
the-Counter Bulletin Board (“OTCBB”), we can reasonably expect that 
an unexpected announcement that the company secured a government 
contract that will quadruple earnings will cause a fairly rapid positive 
price response. It may well be the case that less dramatic news about 
that company may take longer to influence its price. There appears 
little reason to support the notion that slowness of stock-price reaction 
in the less dramatic announcement detracts from the trustworthiness 
of observing the stock’s reaction to the unexpected government contract. 
Moreover, there appears to be no rational basis to categorically conclude 
that investors do not rely on stock prices to reflect dramatic 
announcements; therefore, the tenets underlying Basic’s presumed 
reliance should hold at least in such instances. Furthermore, a clear 
implication of the Gilson and Kraakman externality hypothesis is that 
the world cannot easily be divided between markets that are 
consistently efficient and those that are not. Nonetheless, the lower 
courts’ contemporary analysis holds that a fraud-on-the-market action 
is not available even if an OTCBB-traded company deceives its 
investors by falsely announcing a large government contract. 
Equally disturbing is the serious disconnect between the lower 
courts’ criteria for determining market efficiency and the efficient 
market literature. The intellectual bedrock supporting the efficient 
market hypothesis is the numerous event studies conducted in the 
1970s and 1980s that collectively reported on how quickly stock prices 
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were observed, on a portfolio basis, to respond to various corporate 
announcements.46 The early stock-price studies clustered necessarily 
around the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices 
database that provided stock prices, focusing on large, publicly traded 
firms. In this way, the investigators were similar to the person in the 
classic tale who was looking at night for his car keys, not where he had 
parked his car, but rather in the vicinity of the street lamp because 
there he could see. Also, since the initial empirical work focused on 
testing the validity of the efficient market hypothesis itself, the studies 
naturally concentrated on securities that were more likely to have 
conditions believed to lead to a security’s efficient pricing. In doing so, 
researchers did not cull the database via the litmus test courts have 
developed regarding number of analysts, market capitalization or, for 
that matter, trading volume. They instead focused more broadly, using 
companies that were included in commonly used stock indexes such as 
the Dow Jones Industrial or Standard and Poor’s 500. To be sure, larger 
firms, in terms of market capitalization and trading volume, coupled 
with the presence of institutional trading and a larger number of 
analysts likely cause the price reaction to be quicker. But as Gilson and 
Kraakmann observe, efficiency is not binary, but rather a continuum.47 
And, more recent empirical studies do report on how, and how rapidly, 
price movements occur for over-the-counter securities, even those 
traded in the unregulated “Pink Sheet” market.48 Moreover, absent a 
compelling argument why the speed of price response should determine 
fraud on the market’s application more than the ultimate price change 
itself, foreclosing the application of fraud on the market to instances in 
which the price response on average occurs faster is arbitrary. 
Certainly, the arbitrariness of focusing on hypothetical quickness is 
glaring when there is evidence that a defendant company’s shares 
actually moved dramatically and quickly in response to a disclosure 
that is at the heart of the suit. Furthermore, there is no empirical 
 
 46. For this qualification to the early studies supporting the efficient market hypothesis, see 
Stout, supra note 41, at 653–57 (reasoning that early work focused on merger announcements and 
the like, which were not just significant, but also widely available in contrast to more regular 
announcements of corporate events). 
 47. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 565–66. 
 48. See Laura Frieder & Jonathan Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and 
Corresponding Market Activity 11–12 (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 135, 2007), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920553 (reporting that trading activity 
increased from four percent to seventy percent on day announcement touting stock appeared); 
Kate Litvak, Summary Disclosure and the Efficiency of the OTC Market: Evidence from the Recent 
Pink Sheets Experiment 6–10 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443595 (observing return changes following announcement 
characterizing firms according to relative disclosure practices pursued). 
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evidence that investors are less reliant on price or the noisiness of price 
across various markets. 
C. Divining Efficiency and Fraud from Stock Prices 
Post-Basic courts have confounded their refinement of the 
efficient market hypothesis through undue reliance on stock prices in 
resolving key elements of antifraud suits. They have developed the 
following sequence in the analysis to resolve otherwise-ticklish factual 
questions posed by the suit. Material information always moves a 
stock’s price if the market is efficient. Hence, if there is no observable 
price reaction following an alleged misrepresentation, then either the 
information omitted or misstated was not material or the security is not 
efficiently traded. Thus, investor reliance cannot be presumed.49 As this 
Article will show, assessing market efficiency or materiality by 
observing stock-price changes is trickier than the courts assume. 
In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation is the leading 
case holding that the absence of stock-price response equates to the 
information not being material.50 On September 20, 1994, Burlington’s 
stock dropped nearly thirty percent when it announced that its fourth-
quarter and full-year results were below the levels of a year earlier. 
Investors claimed that Burlington earlier misled them by, among other 
representations, falsely reporting that 1993 earnings included $12.2 
million in extra sales due to that fiscal period having an extra week (i.e., 
fifty-third week). The necessary effect of this fiscal year phenomenon, 
according to the plaintiffs, was that 1994 would fall behind 1993 by 
about $12.2 million in sales produced in the extra week, all things being 
equal.51 In July 1994, Burlington announced that the sales attributable 
to the extra week were $23.2 million, nearly double the amount 
estimated earlier. Plaintiffs, investors who purchased shares during 
1994, argued that investors calculated likely sales for 1994 by 
extrapolating from the erroneous announcement.52 Relying on the lower 
figure caused them to overestimate Burlington’s likely performance in 
1994 and thereby inflated the stock’s price. Because no observable 
stock-price change occurred when the correct extra-week figure was 
 
 49. See generally Michael L. Hartzmark & N. Nejat Seyhun, The Curious Incident of the Dog 
that Didn’t Bark and Establishing Cause-and-Effect in Class Action Securities Litigation, 6 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 415, 420–25 (2012) (reviewing multiple factors that can explain why there can be price 
movement without an accompanying newsworthy announcement and how a newsworthy 
announcement may not be accompanied by observable price movement). 
 50. 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 51. Id. at 1424. 
 52. Id. 
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released in July 1994, the Third Circuit dismissed the claim, reasoning 
that in an efficient market, if the correction of the earlier 
understatement of the extra week’s sales was material, there would 
have been a noticeable change in Burlington’s stock price.53 
As seen, a company’s announcement of unexpected good news 
(e.g., the receipt of a contract that will quadruple sales) can be expected 
to favorably impact a security’s price in any market. Moreover, 
investors likely believe the security’s price would be so impacted that 
the principal justification for Basic’s embrace of fraud on the market 
would appear satisfied if the company falsely claimed to have received 
such a contract. Burlington Coat would also have concluded that the 
price movement upon release of the correct $23.2 million extra-week 
figure, had such price change occurred, would support the assertion 
that the corrective announcement was material.  
But changing the assumed facts of this simple illustration 
reveals the inherent narrowness and unreliability of determining either 
efficiency or materiality based on price response to the challenged 
announcement. For example, what might be the likely effect of 
announcing that the company had obtained a large contract if there 
were substantial expectations that the company would be the winning 
bidder? In this case, any expected favorable effect of the announcement 
on the stock’s price could be due to the reduced uncertainty of whether 
the firm would prevail. If that uncertainty were small, the price 
reaction would be small, if not negligible. What, then, if the company 
fibbed in announcing it had obtained the contract, perhaps fearing 
repercussions if investor expectations were not met? Burlington Coat, 
placing unqualified emphasis on price change, would hold there was no 
material misrepresentation since the false announcement was not 
accompanied by an observable price change.  
This raises the question whether the absence of market 
movement in Burlington Coat could be due to the fact that the corrected 
statement of the $23.2 million benefit flowing from the extra week was 
consistent with investor expectations of what they might have 
 
 53. Id. at 1426–27. By contrast, in No.84 Employer-Teamsters Joint Council Pension Trust 
Fund v. America West Holdings Corp., the Ninth Circuit rejected a bright-line rule requiring an 
immediate market reaction to the disclosed information for it to be deemed material; the court 
reasoned that even an efficient market is “subject to distortions.” 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). In America West Holdings, there was no 
detectable market response to newspaper reports that the airline was skimping on maintenance 
and thereby reporting profitable operations, that it was the subject of an FAA safety investigation, 
or that the airline’s own announcement that problems raised in the earlier news accounts had been 
fully addressed with a settlement with the FAA. See id. at 925–30. This is puzzling because a few 
months later the airline’s stock declined six points when it announced that third quarter earnings 
declined due to unsatisfactory operational performance. See id. at 930. 
3 - Cox PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/22/2013 3:51 PM 
1736 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:6:1719 
extrapolated from information that was available. This would not only 
explain the absence of any price change once the corrected figure was 
released but also justify dismissal of the case since announcement of 
the earlier, lower figure of $12.2 million essentially harmed no one. 
Otherwise, the correct disclosure of $23.2 million in extra sales could be 
expected to elicit a different reaction from investors, since this amount 
was not anticipated.54 In such instances, as well as in pure 
nondisclosure cases, evidence of stock-price change following the 
corrective announcement can substantiate the materiality assertion 
and address whether the market is informationally efficient. 
The muddle following Basic is attributable to a fundamental 
flaw of Basic itself. The plurality opinion invoked a hypothesis that is 
descriptive of the market and then incorrectly used that hypothesis to 
describe investor behavior in response to the market. However, the 
hypothesis is not descriptive of investor behavior. There is nothing in 
the efficient market hypothesis that describes how investors behave; 
the hypothesis only suggests the consequences of their collective 
behavior.55 As such, the efficient market hypothesis is a non sequitur to 
explain probable investor reliance. 
 
 54. Eight years later, the Supreme Court essentially embraced the same reasoning by 
requiring evidence of loss causation for antifraud suits. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336, 347–48 (2005). It may be better to view these cases not as instances of the alleged omitted or 
misstatement failing to cause an economic loss but rather evidence that the misrepresentation did 
not impact the security’s price. This distinction flows naturally from the test of materiality not 
requiring proof that the alleged omission or misstatement changed the investors’ decisions to trade 
or the price for the security. 
 55. Basic, in addition to lacking a solid theoretical foundation for its understanding of the 
efficient market hypothesis, and in limiting fraud on the market to securities that trade in “well-
developed markets,” also appears to be internally inconsistent with the reasoning used to reach 
these conclusions. The Court reasoned that in efficient markets “[a]n investor who buys or sells 
stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.” Basic, 485 
U.S. at 247. Since reliance under this formulation moves from reliance on the particular statement 
made by the defendant to investor reliance on certain understood endowments of the market, why 
then would it not be appropriate for the defendant to argue that aggregation of the investors’ 
claims was inappropriate because reliance by each investor on the integrity of the market’s pricing 
of the security remains to be determined? This request should be denied only if the court were 
prepared to hold that such reliance is nonrebuttable. Instead, Basic recognizes the defendant’s 
right to probe each investor’s reliance, albeit the inquiry arises defensively. Thus, Basic’s dicta of 
an investors’ presumed reliance on the material misrepresentation being rebutted by proof the 
investor would have traded anyway appears to require individual inquiries into reliance. These 
inquiries may be a basis for concluding that common questions of law and fact do not predominate. 
Such an inquiry is unlikely to remove many investors from the class. Nonetheless, the process of 
identifying the few affected viewed at the moment of making the certification question is as 
daunting as inquiring whether each investor traded in the belief that market prices reflected only 
truthful publication or, for that matter, whether the individual investor read the allegedly false 
publication. In either case, hundreds of inquiries would destroy the efficiency of the class action 
procedure. 
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IV. RELIANCE: GENESIS, MEANING, AND FUNCTION 
According to Basic, fraud on the market is all about reliance. But 
why is reliance an element of the antifraud suit? The Second Circuit 
solidified the incorporation of reliance into antifraud jurisprudence in 
List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,56 reasoning that reliance is necessary “to 
certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s 
injury.”57 The court observed that failing to require reliance would 
eliminate “the principle of causation in fact.”58 After reviewing the 
extensive trial record, List held that the district court properly 
concluded that the plaintiffs would have sold their shares regardless of 
whether they had known of the omitted facts.59 
A. The Common-Law Analogy 
List’s incorporation of reliance into antifraud jurisprudence 
likely puzzles tort scholars. Duty is an overarching concern in the 
development of tort law. For example, an individual is not responsible 
to a plaintiff for his own negligent act or omission unless the individual 
owes the plaintiff a duty to act with reasonable care. To determine if 
the individual is responsible for harm caused by negligence, courts 
inquire whether, under the circumstances, it was foreseeable that an 
act or omission negligently committed would have harmed the plaintiff. 
Reliance performs a similar function for the tort of misrepresentation. 
One well-reasoned perspective is that reliance defines the tort of 
misrepresentation at common law, so whether the plaintiff relied on the 
defendant’s false representation does more than define who might 
recover.60 Reliance, in fact, defines the defendant’s duty to speak 
truthfully, since tort law limits the defendant’s duty not to misrepresent 
to those who are either in privity with the defendant or whose actual 
reliance could be foreseen.61 
 
 56. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert denied sub nom., List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). 
There are, of course, much earlier references to reliance in private litigation under the antifraud 
provision. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 833 (D. Del. 1951) (allowing suit 
to proceed because all members of the class relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations). 
 57. List, 340 F.2d at 462. In taking this position, the court liberally invoked the Restatement 
of Torts as well as the leading treatises by Prosser and Harper. Id. 
 58. Id. at 463. 
 59. Id. at 464–65. 
 60. John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 
(2006). 
 61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1977) (stating that a tortfeasor is liable for 
damages resulting from “justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has 
reason to expect their conduct to be influenced” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Hafen v. Strebeck, 338 
F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Utah 2004) (interpreting Minnesota precedent to determine that parties 
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In contrast to the common-law action of misrepresentation or 
deceit, the duty not to engage in material misrepresentations is clearly 
and broadly set forth in Rule 10b-5. The duty exists without evidence of 
reliance. Thus, an SEC enforcement action is successful without proof 
that any investors relied on the misrepresentation. The violation is 
complete upon showing that a material omission or misstatement was 
committed in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 
Because reliance under securities laws serves a function other than 
defining the duty the defendant owes the plaintiff, it should enjoy a role 
distinct from causation in common-law torts. But what is that role? 
An important qualification to the above analysis springs from 
considering what interests the antifraud provision should protect. That 
is, just why is it within the purpose of the antifraud rule to reach a 
particular material omission or misstatement? More specifically, is 
evidence of reliance a necessary component for assuring that the 
interest protected by the antifraud provision is fulfilled in the particular 
case? At the granular level, a material misrepresentation interdicts a 
basic value of the securities laws, namely that of enabling full and fair 
disclosure to investors. The reasons for seeking this goal are multiple62 
and, at the level of a single “classic” investor, easy to defend: a material 
misrepresentation that induces an investor to trade at a price she would 
not otherwise have believed reasonable has harmed that investor. 
Absent evidence that an investor’s decisionmaking is actually impaired, 
 
engaged in arms-length, commercial transactions owe no duty of care for negligent misstatements 
but do owe a duty of honesty, defined as “an inherent duty to be honest and not state intentional 
misrepresentations”); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 604–
06 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that Texas law makes defendants liable for misrepresentation when 
making false or misleading statements that create reliance in others in privity of contract with the 
defendant or others about whom the defendant has information concerning an “especial likelihood” 
that the party will rely on the tortfeasor’s statement); Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ryan, 250 F. Supp. 
600, 607 (W.D. Ark. 1966) (stating that Arkansas law recognizes that vendor/purchaser parties 
with a long-term and trusting relationship owe each other a “duty of honesty” when a specific 
request for information is made, any violation of which can constitute fraud or deceit independent 
of a fiduciary relationship); Woodward v. Dietrich, 548 A.2d 301, 311–16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(holding that a contractor who engaged in misrepresentation could be liable to future buyers of a 
house who were not in privity of contract with the contractor but who foreseeably suffered from 
harm resulting from the contractor’s misrepresentation to a previous buyer); Ernst & Young, LLP 
v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 578–82 (Tex. 2001) (holding that despite Texas’s 
unusually phrased law concerning reliance, misrepresentors are liable in tort for damages 
resulting from reliance by parties in privity of contract or parties about whom the misrepresentor 
has information concerning an “especial likelihood” that the party will rely on the tortious 
statement, consistent with the “reason to expect” language in section 531 of the Second 
Restatement of Torts). 
 62. See James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year Old 
SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 959–61 (2009) (listing as objectives sought by disclosure and antifraud 
provisions identifying capital allocation, facilitating investor decisionmaking, deterring fraud, and 
disciplining managers). 
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there is no cause to believe that the hallowed objective of full and fair 
disclosure was violated. Thus, reliance by the investor on the 
misrepresentation closes the circle and underscores the policy served by 
according that investor standing to sue for conduct inconsistent with 
the antifraud provision.63  
But the illustration is quaint. A good deal of investment 
behavior is driven by decisions unrelated to a particular kernel of 
material information. For example, a financial institution’s decision to 
purchase may be due to portfolio rebalancing arising from its obeisance 
to an indexing strategy. Or consider the lay investor who purchases the 
shares of an industry leader based on financial reports that the 
particular industry should do well in the forthcoming fiscal period.64  
In light of the wide range of possible investor behavior, the focus 
of the antifraud provision should not be limited to protecting investor 
decisionmaking in the narrow context of non-open market-trading 
venues; certainly discriminating among such different approaches to 
investing appears hard to justify if each approach is, to some extent, 
guided substantially by faith in the overall integrity of that market. 
Because a violation exists without demanding evidence that investor 
judgments were adversely affected by the misrepresentation, at least in 
SEC enforcement actions, the conduct does not become less of a 
violation or less harmful to the investor if the complainant is a private 
party who did not rely on the material misrepresentation itself. Thus, 
in the open market context, securities laws should at least serve the 
more generalized objective of assuring investors that the markets are 
not rigged or otherwise populated by fraudulent information. This 
observation appears vital to Justice Blackmun’s discussion of the role 
presumptions play in the resolution of disputes—advancing a public 
interest such as maintaining the integrity of capital markets.65 
To be sure, there is intuitive appeal to the idea that defendants 
in private suits should not be financially responsible for having made a 
materially false statement if that statement played no role in the 
plaintiff’s loss. This concern reflects an understanding of reliance. That 
 
 63. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 895, 912, 914 (2013). Professor Fisch wisely observes that, in its traditional 
appearance, securities fraud was proscribed to protect “the autonomy of the investment decision” 
so that investors “are not deceived into trading.” Id. at 914, 916. With a focus on price, which occurs 
in fraud on the market, the focus shifts to protecting investors who seek to “trade at a price 
undistorted by fraud.” Id. at 914. The point of this Article is that each fits within the purpose of 
the antifraud provision, but that the means to establishing causality is different with reliance 
serving the former and is not necessary in the latter. Reliance therefore is a tool, not an objective. 
 64. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 366 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom., 
Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982). 
 65. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988). 
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is, reliance, at least in the one-on-one situation where the plaintiff deals 
directly with the defendant, serves the critical function of linking the 
plaintiff’s economic loss to the defendant’s misconduct. In this context, 
the investors’ reliance supports both that the statute’s purpose was 
violated and that the violation induced the plaintiff’s trade. It does not, 
however, make the case that the trade caused financial harm to the 
relying investor. More would need to be established before the 
defendant is required to compensate the investor for the harm suffered 
by relying on the defendant’s misrepresentation. This is as it should be. 
Causality is an inherent and desirable element in private litigation. 
Reliance can be seen as one means to establish part of the required 
causality but not as the sole means for establishing causation or for 
linking the defendant’s violation with the plaintiff’s injury. So viewed, 
reliance is part of the causation inquiry. Basic and now Amgen invites 
consideration of whether reliance is a meaningless cog in the causation 
wheel when fraud is perpetrated impersonally on an open market. 
B. Causation Is Context Specific 
It is important for causality to be independently determined in 
securities fraud suits. That is, requiring proof of reliance or establishing 
causation does not render materiality superfluous. The standard for 
materiality is not conditioned on the defendant’s omission or 
misstatement impacting the plaintiff’s, or for that matter anyone else’s, 
investment decision. The test for materiality, first announced by the 
Supreme Court in the context of proxy-statement omissions, “does not 
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.”66 
Rather, materiality requires “a showing of a substantial likelihood that, 
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed 
actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable” investor or 
shareholder.67  
This formulation necessarily means that there are many facts 
that can be material under the circumstances but would not have 
changed the investors’ decision to trade at a particular price, had they 
been disclosed. It is this mismatch between materiality and causality 
that produces so much of the tension around the scope of fraud on the 
market. Fraud on the market does relax the inquiry into causality by 
dispensing with individual inquiries into investor reliance and, thus, 
can place more weight on the broader standard of materiality. The 
 
 66. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 67. Id. 
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application of fraud on the market can be tweaked to address this 
problem of overinclusive recoveries. However, limiting fraud on the 
market to securities traded in markets with certain characteristics (e.g., 
market capitalization and number of analysts) does not address the 
problem at all. On the other hand, evidence that a security’s price 
moved following the release of the allegedly false announcement or the 
correction of an earlier false announcement demonstratively addresses 
the disconnect that otherwise exists between materiality and causality. 
Were materiality to serve the dual purposes of guiding whether 
omissions or misstatements are actionable as well as laying the 
foundation for proving causation, the standard would be inherently 
overinclusive. Under the Court’s analysis, a fact is material irrespective 
of whether its omission or misstatement actually changes the investor’s 
decision, so long as there is a substantial likelihood that the fact would 
have assumed actual significance in the reasonable investors’ 
deliberations. Proof of reliance by the investor moves the inquiry into 
the representation’s causative impact. The reliance element is 
necessary when a piece of information may be significant to an 
objectively qualified investor but, due to a variety of unique 
circumstances, does not assume actual significance to the plaintiff in a 
particular case. Some additional filter is therefore needed because the 
plaintiff’s circumstances may not match the objective standard of the 
reasonable investor. More likely, the omitted or misstated fact may not 
have been so probative as to alter the plaintiff’s investment decision 
from what it would have been had there been no omission or 
misstatement. Thus, a robust inquiry into the plaintiff’s reliance 
overcomes the overbreadth of the materiality standard. In this way, 
reliance links the violation with the plaintiff’s loss. That is, reliance is 
truly a means for determining causality. The allegation of reliance, 
however, is not the only method for establishing causation. 
The preceding view of reliance is consistent with the Court’s 
holding in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, which reversed the 
circuit court’s dismissal of the action because the investors failed to 
establish their reliance.68 The Court succinctly reversed the lower court, 
holding that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily 
a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to 
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be 
material . . . .”69 To many lower courts and commentators, Affiliated Ute 
assigns double duty to the element of materiality; they believe that 
 
 68. 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1972), aff’g in part, rev’g in part Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 
1337 (10th Cir. 1970). 
 69. Id. at 153. 
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proof of materiality establishes both the importance of the alleged 
misrepresentation and that the misrepresentation assumed sufficient 
significance to establish that it induced the plaintiff to trade. This 
conclusion not only ascribes too limited significance to the qualifier 
“under the circumstances of this case” but also overlooks the facts before 
the Court. The Affiliated Ute plaintiffs were unsophisticated, the 
defendants unquestionably stood in a position of trust to the plaintiffs, 
the defendants had a backlog of eager buyers for the shares at prices 
substantially above the price at which the plaintiffs sold their shares to 
the defendants, and the defendants garnered enormous profits through 
their representation of the plaintiffs.70 Thus, Affiliated Ute’s egregious 
facts far more persuasively establish causation than would a 
hypothetical inquiry into the plaintiff’s reliance on an event that never 
occurred. This raises the question whether causality is only resolved by 
reliance. Affiliated Ute’s unique facts, and the Court’s reference to 
“under the circumstances of this case,” clearly support the view that 
causation can be addressed in multiple ways. 
C. Causation in Collective Decisionmaking 
In the corporate setting, many decisions are the composite of 
individual decisions of shareholders. Thus, acquisitions, amendments 
to articles, and even dissolution involve securities transactions for 
which private suits are available when they are accompanied by 
material misrepresentations. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., the 
Court confronted how causation is addressed within the setting of group 
decisionmaking.71 The Court concluded, albeit generally, that causation 
is established by proof that “the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the 
particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in 
the accomplishment of the transaction.”72 The essence of this test is that 
causation exists when the soliciting defendant lacks sufficient voting 
power to approve the transaction solely by voting the shares controlled 
by the defendant.73 The Court reasoned that this approach avoided the 
 
 70. Id. at 145–47. In TSC Industries, the Court defined materiality for the first time. 426 U.S. 
at 449. In doing so, the Court expressly rejected the looser standard that the misrepresentation 
“might” assume significance to the reasonable investor. Id. at 445–47. In dicta, Affiliated Ute 
invoked the “might” standard. 406 U.S. at 153–54. As seen, TSC Industries unhinged the 
materiality test from the misrepresentation’s ultimate impact on the plaintiff’s decision to buy, 
sell, or vote. 426 U.S. at 449. 
 71. 396 U.S. 375, 379 (1970). 
 72. Id. at 385. 
 73. See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1106, 1108 (1991) (finding 
causation missing where defendant’s ownership far surpassed the percentage needed to assure 
approval of the company’s sale based on materially misleading proxy solicitation); Mills, 396 U.S. 
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difficulties of determining how many votes were affected by the 
material omission or misstatement; any doubt regarding the 
misrepresentation’s probable impact on stockholder voting is better 
resolved in favor of voting shareholders—the group Congress intended 
to be the beneficiary of the regulatory provision.74 
Shareholder voting decisions are collective because the will of 
the majority binds the many. Even the extraordinary stockholder who 
knew—through resourcefulness, blind luck, or unique talents—that the 
circulated proxy statement was misleading, and therefore voted against 
the resolution, is bound by the result if the transaction is nonetheless 
approved. Thus, even though the materially misleading proxy 
statement did not interfere with that stockholder’s voting decision, it 
nonetheless was the causal link to the harm befalling the nonduped 
shareholder. Mills shows how aggregations of individual actors not only 
make group decisions, but also suffer as a group. Whether the voting 
shareholder relied or did not rely in this context does not make the harm 
greater or smaller. 
Mills demonstrates that the inquiry into causality is not only 
more encompassing than the inquiry into reliance, but that reliance 
itself can be irrelevant in establishing causation. When it comes to 
causality, as the Court emphasized in Affiliated Ute, the circumstances 
not only matter, they matter a lot. 
Embracing the framework that causation is established by 
evidence that the misrepresentation distorted the security’s price 
creates a clean path forward for clarifying Basic. This would effectively 
render all members of the class price takers rather than pricemakers 
without focusing on their role in “making” the price. As price takers, 
investors would be analogous to the proxy voters in Mills, where the 
Court held it was neither practicable nor desirable to inquire into 
whether each voting stockholder had been duped by the omission. It 
was sufficient that the defendant lacked enough votes to assure 
approval of the merger. A price-distortion method of interpreting fraud 
on the market could build on this approach. The approach would require 
reorienting Basic and now Amgen from its emphasis on investor 
reliance on the pricing process for the securities to whether the price 
itself had been affected. Nonetheless, it is more consistent with Basic 
and Amgen to remain focused on whether the security’s trading 
characteristics are consistent with presumptions regarding investors’ 
reliance on the trustworthiness of the market in which the security was 
 
at 385 n.7 (expressing uncertainty as to whether causation would be an essential link where the 
defendant held sufficient voting power to approve the transaction for which proxies were solicited). 
 74. Mills, 396 U.S. at 1104–06. 
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traded. To be sure, evidence of price distortion would be probative of 
how the security’s prices responded to publicly available information. 
But other information would also be at hand to support or reject 
assertions that investors relied on the integrity of that security’s 
market. 
V. AMGEN’S CLARIFICATION 
Amgen presents an example of how the contemporary 
construction of the antifraud provision pleases neither of the 
combatants in securities class action suits. The Amgen class was 
composed of investors who purchased Amgen shares during a period 
when Amgen allegedly made several material misrepresentations 
regarding two of its major pharmaceutical products, Epogen and 
Aranesp.75 There were two issues before the Court. First, as a condition 
of class certification, should the plaintiffs be required to establish the 
materiality of the alleged misrepresentations?76 Second, should the 
defendant be accorded the opportunity to rebut the assertion of 
materiality by showing that the truth behind each of the alleged 
misrepresentations had already entered the marketplace?77 Defendants 
predictably wanted these issues to be part of the class certification 
decision so as to reduce the hydraulic pressure that class certification 
places on settlement even though those issues were unresolved.78 
Correlatively, the plaintiffs naturally preferred fewer substantive 
determinations in the all-critical certification stage.79 
Amgen’s significance does not lie in how it resolved these 
opposing tugs. As examined more closely below, four justices joined 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, which held that a finding on the merits of 
any substantive element of the antifraud suit is not a precondition to 
class certification.80 To the Amgen majority, courts deciding whether to 
certify the class should only examine whether common questions of law 
and fact predominate, so that their collective resolution makes a class 
action the appropriate procedural mechanism.81 The majority ruled that 
conditioning certification on proof of the alleged misrepresentation’s 
materiality would put the cart of substantive adjudication before the 
 
 75. A full narrative of the facts appears in Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds v. 
Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 76. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). 
 77. Id. at 1203. 
 78. Id. at 1191, 1203. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1191. 
 81. Id. 
3 - Cox PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/22/2013 3:51 PM 
2013] BUILDING ON AMGEN 1745 
horse of procedure.82 Justice Alito concurred, but did so by expressing 
his interest in revisiting the substantive theory on which common 
questions in securities fraud claims depend—the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of market causation.83 Less cautious than Justice Alito 
were the three dissenters who believed the Court should revisit Basic’s 
embrace of fraud on the market.84 Thus, Amgen houses the dog that 
would not bark—the continuing vitality of the securities class action. 
Amgen did not, as some had hoped, depart from the “reliance” 
rhetoric.85 Furthermore, it repeatedly references “efficient”86 and 
“efficiency”87 when describing the instances in which the fraud-on-the-
market approach to causation is applicable. The references are, 
therefore, more specific than Basic’s plurality, which more generally 
referred to “well-developed” markets.88 What distinguishes Amgen is 
the majority’s gloss on their use of “efficient” and “efficiency.” They 
invoked these terms to describe the natural incorporation of financially 
significant information into security prices.89 Therefore, Amgen’s 
significance rests on the move from this observation to conclude that 
most investors “rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased 
assessment of the security’s value in light of all public information.”90 
Missing in Amgen is the emphasis present in Basic that the critical 
reliance is that of investors on the market; in Amgen, there is a subtle 
shift away from some markets having characteristics that attract 
investors’ reliance on security prices to a broader view where the focus 
is on the pricing process and not the market itself. Moreover, Amgen 
does not require that the security historically reflected all material 
public information as a condition of market efficiency. Instead, the 
majority recognized that a security can be deemed traded in an efficient 
market if its shares “generally” reflect publicly available information. 
Amgen offers the following explanation of how the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption is justified: 
This presumption springs from the very concept of market efficiency. If a market is 
generally efficient in incorporating publicly available information into a security’s market 
price . . . it is reasonable to presume that most investors—knowing that they have little 
hope of outperforming the market in the long run based solely on their analysis of publicly 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 84. Id. at 1216 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 85. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 63, at 39 (observing that reliance is inconsistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis and therefore illogical in the context of market-based harm). 
 86. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1188, 1192–93. 
 87. Id. at 1192, 1199. 
 88. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988). 
 89. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. 1192–93. 
 90. Id. at 1192. 
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available information—will rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased assessment 
of the security’s value in light of all public information. Thus, courts may presume that 
investors trading in efficient markets indirectly rely on public, material 
misrepresentations through their “reliance on the integrity of the price set by the 
market.”91 
Amgen, however, does not render price distortion a litmus test 
for fraud on the market’s application;92 Amgen instead invites evidence 
of efficient pricing of the company’s securities. The majority’s sense of 
what constitutes efficiency is a market that regularly reflects publicly 
available information. This would appear to reject the lengthy list of 
criteria that lower courts have developed as the gateway for certifying 
a class based on fraud on the market. Simply stated, Amgen invites the 
testing of market efficiency through empirical observation, namely 
evidence of how a particular security’s price has responded to financial 
announcements. 
Additionally, Amgen establishes that a security can be traded in 
an efficient market even though that market does not always 
incorporate publicly available information into a security’s price. Thus, 
Amgen rejects the numerous holdings in the circuit courts that 
condition fraud on the market on evidence that a firm’s security 
regularly reflected all publicly available information.93 This rejection 
invites lower courts to consider how to rule when a security’s price does 
not respond to financially significant information: is the absence of 
observable price movement evidence that the market is inefficient or 
that an efficient market is documenting the immateriality of the 
information? Amgen also notes that not all investors harbor the same 
belief regarding the futility of earning above average returns by trading 
on public information. In all respects, Amgen moves the framework of 
fraud on the market closer to what is supported by the efficient market 
literature. 
 
 91. Id. at 1192–93 (emphasis added) (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 245). Central to Amgen’s 
holding was Amgen’s concession that the alleged misrepresentations were public and that its 
securities traded in an efficient market, so that “the market for Amgen’s securities promptly 
digested current information regarding Amgen from all publicly available sources and reflected 
such information in Amgen’s stock price.” Id. at 1193. 
 92. Professor Donald Langevoort reports that at least Justice William Brennan, part of the 
thin plurality opinion, preferred a more permissive approach to causation where proof that the 
misrepresentation distorted the security’s price established causation without inquiry into any 
form of investor reliance. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 157 & n.25. Amgen would appear not to change the result in GAMCO 
Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,306 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing a 
claim where the security’s price, even though distorted by fraudulent statements, assumed no 
importance in the investment model used by the investor). 
 93. See supra note 34. 
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VI. SCALIA’S NEAR HIT 
Justice Scalia, separately dissenting, offers an intriguing 
interpretation of Basic. Rather than denying any access to fraud on the 
market, he and the other dissenters would require evidence of 
materiality for certification of the class, reasoning that Basic itself 
premised its presumption on investors’ presumed reliance on the 
security’s price being impacted by a material misrepresentation.94 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning bears some promise for how courts can 
handle fraud-on-the-market suits in the future. 
Presumably, Justice Scalia would have upheld class certification 
if the plaintiffs in Amgen alleged that the defendant’s various 
announcements produced an observable price increase. Similarly, 
Justice Scalia would have found comfort in Basic’s certification because 
the alleged facts showed that each of the three denials was accompanied 
by an observable price drop in Basic’s share prices. The plaintiffs, 
however, alleged neither of these scenarios in Amgen, most likely 
because there was no observable price adjustment. Indeed, the factual 
configuration of each is similar to that of PolyMedica. Each involves a 
disclosure alleged to be materially misleading without confirming any 
change in the issuer’s operations or situation. For example, Basic 
falsely confirmed there would be no value-increasing merger, and 
Amgen confirmed its product was safe. Each, like PolyMedica, offered 
reassurance that past would be prologue as the nondisclosure confirmed 
already-held expectations by investors. In precisely these situations, 
observing market movement is nearly impossible. There, the Court’s 
earlier decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo95 plays an 
important role. 
In Dura, the Court held that in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the complaint must do more than broadly allege that a 
material misrepresentation inflated a security’s price; the plaintiff 
must allege loss causation with particularity (i.e., that an observable 
price correction occurred upon release of the correct information). As a 
result, stock-price movement assumes significance in fraud-on-the-
market cases, since allegations of price movement following a corrective 
disclosure provide prima facie support of loss causation. At the same 
time, a price-correction allegation can also support assertions that an 
earlier misstatement or omission was indeed material. Thus, even 
 
 94. 133 S. Ct. at 1205 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 95. 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). 
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though Amgen and Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton96 rejected the 
necessity of corroboration for class certification, an empirical inquiry 
into price correction can resolve whether the security traded in a 
market whose properties for that type of announcement are sufficient 
to justify Basic’s presumption of investor reliance.97 
Therefore, what may separate Justice Scalia from the Amgen 
majority is disagreement over the time at which evidence of stock-price 
movement should be interjected into the suit. The majority believes 
requiring proof of materiality as a condition to certification places the 
resolution of a central factual element into the pretrial stage, the 
certification of the class; the majority believed proof of this element was 
common to all members of the class. At the same time, the Court’s 
decision in Dura requires that a complaint set forth facts establishing 
loss causation in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Thus, pursuant 
to Dura, Amgen should have been dismissed if all the complaint alleges 
is that Amgen’s false statements caused its price to increase but failed 
to allege any price correction following Amgen’s later corrective 
announcement. 
With these potential scenarios in mind, is more at stake in 
Amgen, and earlier in Halliburton, than the procedural question of 
whether materiality and loss causation must be addressed via a motion 
to dismiss or as conditions for class certification? Each procedural rule 
poses a burden on the plaintiff at the pleading stage. If Amgen and 
Halliburton had each been decided differently, the burden confronting 
the plaintiff would have been more formidable; the standard would 
require that a preponderance of the evidence support the claim of 
materiality and loss causation, consistent with what courts have done 
on other class certification issues (e.g., whether the security was traded 
in an efficient market). Should the choice be influenced by whether the 
class certification decision occurs only after resolution of motions to 
dismiss and summary judgment?  
Each party likely seeks an early decision on certification of the 
class. With the class certified, even preliminarily, the plaintiff enjoys 
the hydraulic pressure that decision places on the defendant to settle. 
 
 96. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (holding Fifth 
Circuit erred in requiring evidence of loss causation as a condition to certifying the class). The 
Court, similar to the Court in Amgen, stressed that loss causation, unlike reliance, does not 
implicate commonality. Therefore, the inquiry into loss causation is not germane to class 
certification. 
 97. The Ninth Circuit reached a very curious result in Miller v. Thane International, Inc., 
holding that although the market for the defendant company’s stock was not efficient per the 
Cammer standards, nonetheless the absence of stock-price change upon revelation of the truth 
established the absence of loss causation. 615 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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If the defendant prevails and the suit is not certified as a class, the suit 
disappears; if the defendant loses on class certification, it can still 
retain hope that its other pretrial motions will be successful. Moreover, 
the defendant enjoys another strategic advantage by advancing class 
certification before other pretrial motions: until all pretrial motions are 
resolved, the plaintiff does not enjoy discovery rights, so that in doing 
battle on many issues that can be in dispute for class certification, the 
plaintiff could have much less information than if the contest over class 
certification followed all the pretrial motions. In a nondisclosure case, 
the absence of discovery could hinder the plaintiffs’ ability to identify 
when the defendant became aware of certain information. This 
knowledge would have helped plaintiffs’ experts isolate probable impact 
of disclosures on a security’s price in order to demonstrate the 
informational efficiency of the market. 
Therefore, there is less distance separating Justice Scalia from 
the Amgen majority than meets the eye, assuming each camp is willing 
to look holistically at the facts. Why should a factual allegation about 
loss causation that is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss not also 
be probative of the alleged materiality for class certification? 
Procedurally, the allegations in the complaint are tested on the 
assumption that they are correct. Therefore, the motion to dismiss tilts 
favorably toward the plaintiff. By contrast, the plaintiff does not enjoy 
deference in factually intensive class certification hearings. But, if the 
class certification hearings occurred after ample opportunity for 
discovery, a fuller examination of the suit would result. The plaintiffs’ 
bar may prefer if the Amgen majority swung more toward Justice 
Scalia’s perspective of Basic and focused on price distortion, instead of 
a poorly conceived assessment of market efficiency and a conditional 
presumption of reliance. Nonetheless, Amgen’s repeated references to 
“efficient” and “efficiency” and the Amgen majority’s view that these 
expressions refer to stocks that trade in informationally efficient 
markets cabin fraud on the market to such markets rather than on a 
bare showing of price distortion itself. This formulation thus invites a 
more probing inquiry of whether the trading in that security likely 
would be impacted by information alleged to be misstated or omitted, 
not just of narrow features of the individual security’s market. 
The Court’s earlier decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 
proves instructive on this point.98 Eisen involved a securities class 
action with approximately six million class members. After a hearing, 
the district court accepted the plaintiff’s position that notice to members 
 
 98. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974), aff’g 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 
1973), rev’g 54 F.R.D. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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of the class could be provided by publication and assigned ninety 
percent of the notice cost to the defendants based on its finding that the 
class would likely prevail on the merits.99 The circuit court reversed the 
ruling,100 and the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit’s decision, 
reasoning as follows: 
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any 
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine 
whether it may be maintained as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the 
Rule by allowing a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without 
first satisfying the requirements for it. He is thereby allowed to obtain a determination 
on the merits of the claims advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance that a 
class action may be maintained.101 
Importantly, both the circuit and Supreme Court decisions 
rejected a hearing that focused on the suit’s merits. The Supreme Court 
emphasized that a preliminary hearing on the merits could prejudice 
the case against the defendant since such a hearing likely would not be 
accompanied by traditional rules of evidence and procedure.102 
However, it is consistent with Eisen to have such a hearing focus on 
issues relevant to class certification,103 such as whether the particular 
security traded in an informationally efficient market.104 That is, Eisen 
does not foreclose lower courts from merit-based-like findings that link 
to whether the suit meets Rule 23’s criteria for class certification. 
Indeed, hearings today are regularly held and evidentiary findings are 
made when class certification depends on whether a security traded in 
an efficient market such that the suit can be maintained on a fraud-on-
the-market theory. This occurs even though there may well be 
 
 99. 54 F.R.D. at 573. 
 100. 479 F.2d at 1015–16. 
 101. 417 U.S. at 177–78. 
 102. Id. at 178. 
 103. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (stating that “sometimes 
it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the 
certification question,” even though such a determination “generally involves considerations that 
are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action’ ” (quoting 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978))); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 & n.6 (2011) (reaffirming the holding of Falcon, but clarifying that the Court 
found “nothing in . . . Rule 23 . . . gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into 
the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action”). 
 104. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
the trial judge is responsible for making factual findings about whether conditions for fraud on the 
market have been satisfied); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(reversing district court for failing to inquire beyond factual allegations in complaint to determine 
whether there was sufficient basis to invoke fraud on the market). See generally Patricia Groot, 
Note, Fraud on the Market Gets a Minitrial: Eisen Through In re IPO, 58 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1166 
(2009) (showing that the holdings in Eisen and Falcon allow courts to consider relevant factual 
issues in making a decision on class certification). 
3 - Cox PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/22/2013 3:51 PM 
2013] BUILDING ON AMGEN 1751 
important overlaps between factors relevant to such a class certification 
determination and issues bearing on the ultimate merits of the suit. 
What has changed in Amgen is clarification by the Amgen majority that 
investor reliance is presumed where the market is informationally 
efficient, which, as reasoned here, is a condition that can and should be 
determined through empirical observation. 
VII. CONCLUSION: MATCHING THE APPROACH WITH TODAY’S MARKETS 
Basic projected how reasonable investors are presumed to 
behave based on a hypothesis of how securities markets perform. While 
it did so on the infant base of literature supporting the efficient market 
hypothesis, it also justified the presumption more traditionally, 
anchored in “fairness, public policy and probability, as well as judicial 
economy.”105 The world has moved on since that presumption was first 
formulated. 
For example, institutional investors who owned about twenty-
four percent of public firms’ equities in 1980 owned seventy percent in 
2010. The typical NYSE-listed company had about fifty-four 
institutional holders in 1980; now such firms have 405 institutional 
shareholders. As assets have aggregated, passive management of funds 
has grown more common. Thus, more than one-third of total mutual 
fund and exchange traded fund assets are passively managed.106 
Indeed, the average annual growth of passive assets promoted through 
mutual funds and exchange-traded funds has been twenty-six percent, 
compared to just thirteen percent for actively managed funds.107 This 
rapid movement toward passive investment, namely through indexing 
strategies, is mirrored by changes occurring with other institutional 
investors. For example, the giant pension fund CalPERS has invested 
more than one-half of its $255 billion portfolio in passive strategies and 
is actively considering a move to a totally passive portfolio.108 
Aside from the overt move toward passive investing, there is 
growing evidence that herding exists among institutional investors, 
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according to developed “style”-characteristics-favored sectors. Pursuant 
to this practice, money managers and individual investors view 
securities as part of a group having shared characteristics and not as 
individual items. Herding ensues when investors seek to mimic the 
returns garnered earlier by investors moving into a particular style or 
category of investment. As a consequence, investment decisions are not 
guided by the cash flows of the individual firm but rather the risk-
return profile of the group.109 Neither passive investing nor style 
investing defy the presumption as formulated in Basic because neither 
is centered on the price of the individual firm’s security; rather, both 
strategies focus more generally on the overall integrity of securities 
markets.110 
Basic’s supposition that investors rely on the price of a 
particular security is quaint in light of the dramatic changes that have 
occurred in equity markets and investment strategies. When the Court 
revisits Basic, which appears likely, it should bear in mind that 
markets, and particularly trading strategies, have changed markedly 
since fraud on the market was first conceived. The changes in markets, 
especially the moves toward increasing amounts of passive investing, 
are a testament to investors’ foundational belief that markets are fair. 
It is this presumptive fairness—and the facts that attract investors to 
have this belief—that should guide courts in deciding whether a trade 
in a particular security should enjoy the protection of fraud on the 
market because that security traded in a market that shared this broad 
investor belief. It is a belief more broadly based than the security’s 
price; it is founded on assumptions of the pricing process itself. Of 
course, the Court could continue to adhere to the binary view that 
markets are either efficient or not efficient, as determined by a set of 
criteria divorced from empirical or theoretical support. Another option 
is to rid the courts of fraud on the market and thereby deprive most 
investors of the only means by which they can recoup funds lost due to 
fraud. Neither of these latter two approaches is as compelling as 
applying fraud on the market based on the assumptions that do, in fact, 
underlie investor engagement in public markets. 
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The position advanced in this Article is that Amgen’s clear 
embrace of informational efficiency as the cornerstone of fraud on the 
market rids the theory of its once-binary quality. Now, courts can fully 
examine the information processing capabilities of the market in which 
a security is traded. The objective of that examination is whether 
investor expectations that information of the type alleged to have been 
misleading would customarily be impounded in the security’s price. If 
so, investor reliance would be presumed, so that the class could be 
certified pursuant to fraud on the market. 
 
